INTRODUCTION
China and India are two of the oldest civilizations in the world, with their relationship widely regarded as one of the central pillars of global politics. These Asian giants share much in common, such as the Himalayas, ancient civilizations, colonial pasts, current challenges, and future potentials. India was the first non-communist country to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and started diplomatic relations with China.[1] Recently, India and China marked the year 2020 as the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. [2]
The strategic manoeuvres of the dominant powers of Asia, i.e., India and China have shaped the geopolitical landscape of Asia. China’s strategy known as “String of Pearls” has emerged as a point of contention and has a detrimental effect on the nation’s relations.
In this blog, we will delve deep into the origins, and components of the String of Pearls strategy, we will then examine its implications for India-China relations, and lastly discuss the perspectives of other nations on this issue.
THE STRING OF PEARLS: ORIGIN AND COMPONENTS
The U.S. consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton in 2004, first termed “String of Pearls” in a report. It specifically analysed China’s efforts to strategically expand its influence and secure its maritime interests across the Indian Ocean through the development of port facilities, naval bases, and economic partnerships in key locations. These locations extend from the Chinese mainland to the Port of Sudan in the Horn of Africa.[3]
Key Components
- Gwadar Port in Pakistan: This port in Pakistan is located near the Strait of Hormuz on the Arabian Sea. Through this, a considerable portion of the world’s oil passes. It provides China with a strong grip near the Persian Gulf. The port offers a crucial link in the CPEC, part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Pakistani officials consider China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, to be a key pillar of their country’s “all-weather” relationship with China, emphasizing its significance in Pakistan’s agenda for enhancing regional connectivity and promoting sustainable development. [4]
- Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka: China’s investment in Sri Lanka’s port has raised the brows of several nations. This port has quite a strategic location along a major sea lane. Recently, Sri Lanka and China have signed a 99-year lease agreement for the southern part of the port’s control. This has sparked speculations about China’s long-term strategic intentions in the region.[5]
- Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar: For energy imports, this port in Myanmar offers an alternative route for China. Kyaukpyu helps China in bypassing the Malacca Strait and directly connects China to the Indian Ocean. This port serves as a part of a larger project that includes oil and gas pipelines stretching from Kyaukpyu to Yunnan province in China.[6]
- Chittagong Port in Bangladesh: China has actively invested in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Port. China focuses on enhancing its strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal through this investment. It is a part of broader economic cooperation agreements that would further strengthen China’s influence in Bangladesh.[7]
INDIA’S NECKLACE OF DIAMOND STRATEGY
“Necklace of Diamonds” approach, a concept coined by India’s former foreign secretary Lalit Mansingh while addressing at a think tank in August 2011. India’s “necklace of diamonds” plan is essentially a reaction to China’s “String of pearls”.
The strategy includes building ports, extensive Coastal Surveillance Radar (CSR) systems to track Chinese warships and submarines, importing state-of-the-art surveillance planes that can track down Chinese submarines and operating an airport in a neighbouring country to keep an eye on the port built by China. It also involves deepening defence ties, expanding bilateral relations with South Asian countries, island nations in the Indian Ocean region, and Southeast Asian nations, and carrying out regular military exercises with the navies of the USA, Japan, and Australia.
Some of the key efforts made by India to oppose the Chinese Navy and its influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region are listed below:
- India’s Act East Policy, which was implemented to integrate the country’s economy with South-East Asian nations. It has been utilized to form key military and geopolitical alliances with Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, assisting India in countering China.
- Building and Accessing Ports
India is developing Chabahar Port in Iran to establish a new land-sea connection to Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. Strategically positioned near China’s Gwadar Port in Pakistan and close to the Strait of Hormuz, Chabahar strengthens India’s presence in the region. Overlooking the Gulf of Oman, the port enhances India’s strategic influence along a critical oil supply route.
Similarly, India is constructing a deep-sea port in Sabang, Indonesia, to bolster its strategic reach near the Strait of Malacca and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Myanmar and India constructed a deep-water port in Sittwe in 2016.
Bangladesh – India would assist Bangladesh in modernizing its Mongla seaport. India can also use the port of Chittagong, Bangladesh.
- Military and naval relationships: In order to improve and train its navy, India has formed a strategic naval cooperation with Myanmar, giving it a stronger presence in the region. It has also reached agreements for military cooperation in the region with Japan, Australia, and the United States. The four countries, known as the ‘Quad’, conduct combined military exercises in the Indian Ocean region.
- Building Coastal Radar Networks
Bangladesh – India recently struck an agreement to build 20 Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems along Bangladesh’s coastline. This will assist India in monitoring Chinese warships, which have been often visiting the Bay of Bengal.
India will build ten Coastal Radar systems in the Maldives. These radars will transmit live photos, videos, and location data of ships sailing through the Indian Ocean region. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) is implementing the project.Sri Lanka has six Coastal Surveillance Radars. According to certain estimates, India intends to establish at least ten more CSRs in Sri Lanka. The Indian and Sri Lankan governments are constantly working to strengthen connections between the two countries.
Mauritius has eight coastal surveillance radars deployed.
In Seychelles, one coastal surveillance radar (CSR) has been installed. The first Coastal Surveillance Radar in Seychelles went operational in 2015. It was commissioned in Mahe, the major island. Additional coastal surveillance radar will be placed on the small islands of Astove, Assumption, and Farquhar. Seychelles wants to install 32 additional Coastal Surveillance Radar systems.
Building ports in partnership with other nations and signing bilateral agreements with them are typically done to strengthen commercial ties and open up new trade avenues for India. It helps India fight China’s influence in these countries. [8]
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS
The String of Pearls has been perceived by India as a form of strategic encirclement which has serious detrimental effects on the relations between the two nations.
Strategic Concerns
India opines that it is China’s strategy of development of ports and the carious infrastructure projects is yet another strategy to contain India’s influence in the IOR. Recognizing the escalating tensions between the two, India strengthened its ties with other regional nations, including Japan, the United States, and Australia. This Grouping is known as the QUAD (2007).[9]
Indian Countermeasures
In response to the String of Pearls, India has taken several countermeasures. India has recently signed a 10-year contract with Iran for the operation of a terminal at Iran’s Chabahar Port. It is enhancing naval cooperation with like-minded countries and increasing its presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to monitor Chinese activities in the region.[10]
India aims to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the IOR in a two-fold manner. Firstly, by strengthening its partnerships and secondly by enhancing its maritime influence.
CONCLUSION
To strengthen and normalize relations between India and China, they must overcome psychological hurdles and let go of previous experiences. India and China have the potential to positively influence world politics and economic. Except for border conflicts and the recent String of Pearls strategy of China, there are no significant bilateral issues that could negatively impact relations.
India and China must prioritize promoting peace to ensure equitable global economic order, world peace, and prosperity. Failure to realize potential and commitments can hurt both nations. Both countries should collaborate on issues such as peaceful coexistence, the New International Economic Order, equitable resource distribution, technology sharing, and reforming international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization. This is feasible when India and China overcome their preconceptions and begin a new chapter of friendship and understanding.
Author(s) Name: Mehak Gupta (Faculty of law, University of Delhi)
References:
[1] Zhiqun Zhu, “China-India Relations in the 21st Century: A Critical Inquiry” (2011) pp. 1-16, 1
[2] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “70th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between India and China” (April 1, 2020) < https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32608/70th_Anniversary_of_the_Establishment_of_Diplomatic_Relations_between_India_and_China> accessed 9 March 2025
[3] Ashley S. Townshend, “Unraveling China’s “String of Pearls” (September 16, 2011) <https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/unraveling-chinas-string-pearls> accessed 9 March 2025
[4] Dr. John Calabrese, “Gwadar is the future”: China and Pakistan’s troubled strategic port on the Arabian Sea” (May 14, 2024) < https://www.mei.edu/publications/gwadar-future-china-and-pakistans-troubled-strategic-port-arabian-sea > accessed 9 March 2025
[5] Kiran Stacey, “China signs 99-year lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port” (2024) < https://www.ft.com/content/e150ef0c-de37-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c > accessed 9 March 2025
[6] Zachary Fillingham, “Backgrounder: Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu Port” (November 14, 2023) < https://southasiajournal.net/backgrounder-myanmars-kyaukpyu-port/ > accessed 9 March 2025
[7] Sohini Bose, “The Chittagong Port: Bangladesh’s trump card in its diplomacy of Balance” (May 17, 2022) < https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/bangladeshs-trump-card-in-its-diplomacy-of-balance> accessed 9 March 2025
[8] Yash Jha, “Necklace of diamonds vs string of pearls : India-China standoff” (June 23, 2022) < https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/readersblog/youthwrites/necklace-of-diamonds-vs-string-of-pearls-india-china-standoff-43458/> accessed 10 March 2025
[9] Nectar Gan, “China is alarmed by the Quad. But its threats are driving the group closer together” (May 23, 2022), < https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/23/china/quad-summit-china-threat-analysis-intl-hnk-mic/index.html> accessed 10 March 2025
[10] Shubhajit Roy, “What are India’s stakes in Iran’s Chabahar port?” (May 15, 2024) <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/what-are-indias-stakes-in-irans-chabahar-port-9326692/ > accessed 10 March 2025
