INTRODUCTION
While there exist certain variations to the definition of Assault, broadly, it can be defined as “an attempt or a threat to do a corporeal hurt to another, coupled with an apparent present ability and intention to do the act. Any gesture calculated to excite the party threatened a reasonable apprehension that the party threatening intends immediately to offer violence, or, in the language of the Indian Penal Code, 1860[1], is ‘about to use criminal force’ to the person threatened, constitutes, if coupled with a present ability to carry such intention in execution, an assault of law.” Another critical aspect of this tort emphasises that words are only adequate when accompanied by conduct, thus adding substance to the act constituting assault.
Therefore, the topic at hand and the current dilemma is whether or not an assault can be defined just by words. What happens when a plaintiff’s ability to behave themselves generally throughout the day is cognitively distorted by words alone? Would they still not have been given a remedy under assault?
ORIGINAL STANDING OF WORDS UNDER ASSAULT
For an act to constitute an assault, certain essentials must be satisfied, such as intent, apparent ability to carry out the purpose, apprehension, and knowledge of the threat[2].However, the exhaustive definition fails to focus on aspects other than the physical conduct to prove the above essentials. For instance, in the landmark case of Stephen v. Myers (1830)[3]at a nearby parish, the claimant presided over a conference. The defendant at the opposite end of the table got up and threatened to pull the chairman out of the chair and then be turned out of the room. Then, he moved closer to the claimant and shook his fist. However, the churchwarden intervened before he could get close enough to make a blow. Here, the court held the defendant was liable for assault as his actions, along with words, indicated the means of carrying the threat into effect. In a similar vein, the defendant in Read v. Coker (1853)[4]was found accountable for threatening to break the claimant’s neck. Therefore, a pattern can be observed in which physical behaviour that may include using words to give the act more context is the primary factor in distinguishing an act from coming under the purview of assault.
WORDS AS MORE THAN JUST “MERE WORDS”
If words under assault do not hold sufficient magnitude, does that imply they are unnecessary? The question of whether words alone could constitute an assault was brought under the court’s focus in the case of R v. Meade and Belt[5] in 1823, where Holroyd J stated that “no words or singing are equivalent to an assault.” Thus, according to this judgment, if the defendant is beating the plaintiff’s brother and says that the plaintiff is next, it would not constitute an assault[6]. Nevertheless, if we assess this situation accurately, we can determine all the essentials required to constitute an assault. There was a direct and imminent threat, intention, and ability to carry out this threat, thus providing the plaintiff adequate reasoning and possibility of apprehension.
As a result, the judgment passed in R v. Meade and Belts(1823)[7]attracted a lot of criticism, and the court started to evaluate the significance of words and whether a remark would fall under the ambit of “mere words.”[8]For instance, in R v. Burstow (1997)[9], the defendant, who had a brief relationship with the plaintiff, could not accept their separation and constantly bothered her. He made silent telephone calls, wrote hate mail, and even had abusive phone calls, causing psychiatric injury to the plaintiff. Expressing views on this subject, Taylor J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales said, “I am not persuaded that threats uttered over the telephone are to be properly categorised as mere words. I think it is a matter of the circumstances. To telephone a person in the early hours of the morning, not once but on many occasions, and to threaten him, not in a conversational tone but in an atmosphere of drama and suspense, is a matter that a jury could say was well calculated to not only instil fear into his mind but to constitute threatening acts, as distinct from mere words. ”Thus, in this digital age, we receive threats that can be communicated remotely to the plaintiff. Harm can be inflicted by people who are way out of sight, and this apprehension caused in the mind of a reasonable person should not fall outside the scope of an assault.[10]Even if the words used create a situation of conditional threat[11], such as “Your money or your life,” it would say to be an assault.[12]
Finally, whether words alone could constitute an assault under Section 47 of the Offences Against a Person Act, 1861,[13] was the issue presented before the court in R v. Constanza (1997)[14]. In this case, the defendant trailed the plaintiff for over two years, writing offensive words on her house door, making silent phone calls, and even sending letters with threatening language. The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the plaintiff and upheld the conviction for assault occasioning bodily harm induced solely by words. A similar judgment was passed in R v. Ireland (1997)[15], which further added that silence if it induces fear in the victim, which leads the victim to be afraid that the threat would be acted on in the future, would suffice as assault. Here, proximity remained irrelevant as fear could be inflicted through telephones and other electronic gadgets. Lord Steyn stated, “The proposition… that words cannot suffice is unrealistic and indefensible (the phone caller) intends his silence to cause fear and intimidation.” Hence, the court must understand the significance of distinguishing words spoken in light of anger from mere words to act as a threat.
CONCLUSION
Nonetheless, it becomes crucial to assess threats that fall under the ambit of assault and focus on various ways that convey the apprehension of imminent threat.Due to the significance of words, they also can negate the assault, as in the case of Turberville v. Savage (1669)[16], where the defendant puts his hand on the sword and says, ‘If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you.’ These words thus prevented what could have constituted an assault. Therefore, for the assault tort, it is argued that the only threats that qualify as direct threats are those that, either by themselves or in conjunction with words, give rise to a reasonable fear of an impending, direct bodily contact between the plaintiff and the defendant, or by words alone that cause the plaintiff to reasonably fear a threatening, direct bodily contact with someone or something under the defendant’s control.[17]
Author(s) Name: Nandini Singh (Symbiosis Law School, Pune)
Reference(s):
[1]Indian Penal Code, 1860
[2]Ratanlal, Dhirajlal, The Law of Torts (first published 1897, 28th edn) 848
[3]Stephen v Myers [1830] C &P 4 349
[4]Read v Coker [1853] CB 13 850
[5]R v Meade and Belt [1823] CC 1 184
[6]Glanville Williams, Assault and Words (1957, Crim L Rev) 219
[7]R v Meade and Belt [1823] CC 1 184
[8] R v Wilson [1955] WLR 1 493
[9]R v Burstow [1997] UKHL 34
[10]Routledge Cavendish, Criminal Lawcards (first published 2008, 6th edn) 14
[11]Read v Coker [1853] CB 13 850
[12]P. R Handford, Tort Liability for Threatening or Insulting Words (1976, Can B Rev) 563
[13]Offences Against a Person Act, 1861
[14]R v Constanza [1997] CR 2 492
[15]R v Ireland [1997] WLR 3 534
[16]Tuberville v Savage [1669] E.R86 684
[17]F. A. Trinade, ‘Intentional Torts: Some Thoughts on Assault and Battery’ [1982]
